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resUmO
Este artigo tem como objetivo explorar a decisão de integração vertical de uma empresa processadora de carne, usando uma 
abordagem que integra a área de estratégia de operações e a teoria econômica dos custos de transação. Nesse estudo, a integração 
vertical é considerada uma decisão estrutural da estratégia de operações determinada pela existência de custos de transações. O 
estudo de caso de uma empresa processadora de carne brasileira ilustra os principais pressupostos teóricos levantados no estudo. 
Os resultados sugerem que a teoria dos custos de transação auxilia na identificação dos pontos-chave das decisões estratégicas 
de integração vertical pelo seu caráter comportamental, reduzindo os efeitos da incerteza e da especificidade dos ativos. Ao final, 
sugerem-se novas pesquisas.
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AbsTrAcT
This article aims to explore the vertical integration decision of a beef processor from an integrated approach operations strategy and 
transaction costs economic theory. In this research, vertical integration as a structural decision of operations strategy determined 
by the occurrence of transaction costs. The paper presents one case study carried out in one beef Processor Company which 
illustrates the main theoretical assumptions. The results suggest that transaction costs economics helps to identify key points of 
major strategic decisions on vertical integration due to its behavioural perspective, reducing the effect of uncertainty and asset 
specificity of this decision. At the end of the paper, future research is suggested.
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1 inTrODUcTiOn
  Operations  Strategy  involves  several 
decisions that determine how a company will compete 
on  marketplace  (WHEELWRIGHT,  1984).  Vertical 
Integration  is  one  of  these  structural  decisions  and, 
commonly, it is defined as the decision of making or 
buying. A more complete definition states that “vertical 
integration is the means of co-ordinating the different 
stages of a supply chain when bilateral trading is not 
beneficial”  (STUCKEY  &  WHITE,  1993,  p.  71). 
Usually,  financial  calculus  on  set-up  costs  and  risks 
assessment are the main bias for this decision making. 
However, there are strategic implications on the vertical 
integration decision. We agree with Slack et al. (2004) 
that Operations Management is an area formed by several 
theories  from  different  backgrounds  and  Transaction 
Costs Economics looks promising and it is still under 
applied. These authors also claim that there is a need 
to develop theories that are useful for managers when 
taking decisions. Vertical decision can be assessed from 
an operation strategy perspective as well as a supply 
chain framework. The former will be considered in this 
paper. This paper highlights the discussion bringing data 
from previous research on beef processing sector. The 
food processing, and specifically beef, deals with specific Organizações Rurais & Agroindustriais, Lavras, v.10, n.3, p. 317-327, 2008
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features such as the perishable nature of products, the 
small contribution margins and commercial transactions 
occurring by spot market mechanism (STANK et al., 
1999). Thus, food processing is a way of identifying 
safeguards used by firms to reduce risk and uncertainty. 
The TCE framework provides behavioural and economic 
descriptions that may be helpful for decision makers. 
This  paper  draws  the  decision  of  vertically  integrate 
operations  or  not  reviewing  the  main  concepts  and 
research applicability provided by the Transaction Costs 
Economics  (TCE),  a  New  Institutional  theory  based 
on Williamson’s work (1975, 1985). The discussion of 
a case study of a Brazilian beef processor that decided 
to  vertically  integrate  its  operations  is  used  as  an 
illustration of the theoretical assumptions. Finally, the 
paper explores the applicability of TCE to the Operation 
Strategy research and managerial implications.
2 TrAnsAcTiOn cOsTs ecOnOmics
  Transaction  Costs  Economics  states  that 
exchanges  between  two  independent  agents  involve 
transaction  costs  of  different  degrees.  Economic 
institutions then evolve to lower these transaction costs. 
Williamson  (1971,  1975)  defended  that  transaction 
costs could be reduced, in certain cases, by substituting 
spot  market  exchange  for  vertical  integration.  Later, 
Williamson  (1985)  recognises  that  most  common 
transactions occur between the spot market and vertical 
integration extremes, which are known as hybrid forms 
(different kinds of co-operation levels between firms). 
  Behavioural  theory  has  a  strong  influence  on 
TCE assumptions. Simon (1957) broke-up the economist’s 
belief of full rationality when opportunism and bounded 
rationality were proposed. These two factors occur when 
one or more agents know the underlying circumstances 
relevant  to  the  transaction,  although  this  information 
cannot be costlessly discussed by or displayed to others. 
Opportunism is “the self-interest seeking with guile” and 
has a central role in aggravating resource allocation in TCE 
framework. Williamson suggests that opportunism can be 
attenuated by vertical integration strategy. Alternatively, 
he  suggests  the  use  of  contracts  to  create  safeguards 
against opportunistic behaviour by one agent. 
Williamson  identified  three  critical  dimensions  to 
characterise a transaction: the uncertainty under which 
the  transaction  takes  place,  the  level  of  transaction 
specific investment and the frequency that transaction 
occurs.  Uncertainty  can  be  stated  as  an  imperfect 
knowledge about an event. The uncertainty surrounding 
a transaction can assume different levels. On one hand, 
for the buyer, it can be an uncertainty of quality, a reliable 
supply, timeliness or quantity. On the other hand, it can 
be the seller searching for a buyer. And for both agents, 
price can be uncertain (HOBBS & YOUNG, 2000).
  The  second  feature  is  asset  specificity 
(WILLIAMSON,  1985),  that  means  how  specific  the 
investment  is  for  the  activity  and  the  costs  required 
reallocating it for another use. It is considered the most 
important  empirical  determinant  of  the  transaction 
(GLOBERMAN & SCHWINDT, 1986; WILLIAMSON, 
1975) due to its measurability. Williamson (1979), citado 
por Menard (1996) e Neves (2003) identified six sources 
of asset specificity:
1.  site  or  location  –  it  relates  to  geographical 
factors.
2.  physical  –  it  relates  to  the  characteristics  of 
inputs  in  use,  when  reallocation  is  almost 
impossible due to the specificity for that activity 
such as citric juice extractors, sugar cane mills, 
and beer factory fermentation machines.
3.  dedicated – it relates to the choice of investment 
a  firm  makes  in  relation  to  other’s  needs. 
Examples  can  be  the  investments  made  by 
producers in the distribution channels such as 
special displays, refrigerators.
4.  human – it relates to qualifications developed 
by labourers making their redeployability on the 
market difficult. They could be subcontracted 
or trained in the company, representing a cost 
in their reallocation for another activity.
5.  brand-named specificity – it relates to reputation, Organizações Rurais & Agroindustriais, Lavras, v.10, n.3, p. 317-327, 2008
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building  of  a  name  or  brand  in  a  certain 
market,  the  effort  of  public  relations  within 
the community, with the press, development of 
packages, sales promotions, advertising, etc
6.  temporal - the time available to carry out the 
transaction. It also analyses of the perishability 
of the product and storage policy. Mechanisms 
such as just-in-time deliveries and the need for 
frequent and fast delivery are involved in this 
specificity.
  Williamson  proposed  that  firms  emerged 
to  manage  investments  with  a  great  deal  of  “asset 
specificity” because the sunk character of investments 
exposed their owners to threats of profit expropriation 
(LAMOUREAUX & RAFF, 1995, p. 3). The presence 
of higher specificity increases risk for the owner of this 
asset. If there is no trust or safeguards, it can be too risky 
for the firm to make such specific investment. 
  Frequency is the third feature and it states that 
if a transaction occurs frequently in similar ways, a firm 
develops routines to manage it efficiently. For example, 
learning  by  doing  is  a  natural  result  of  long-term 
relationships. On the other hand, if the transaction is not 
frequent, agents need to bargain about its terms, resulting 
on raises on the costs of carrying out the transaction.
  Similarly, Williamson  (1985)  identified  three 
kinds of transaction costs: first, search or information 
costs associated with finding information about products, 
prices,  inputs,  new  partners,  buyers  and  sellers.  The 
second kind, negotiation costs, includes agreements over 
trade terms (price, delivery, quality, among other), and 
the costs of writing contracts or paying a commission 
rate to an intermediary. The last kind of transaction costs, 
monitoring, are associated with inducing compliance, but 
may also involve feedback both from the quality of the 
goods or from the behaviour of a supplier or buyer after 
the transaction (HOBBS, 1996, 1997; SAKO, 1992).
  In sum, TCE is a positive theory that aims at 
understanding inter-firm relationships and how various 
forces can cause it to change. 
2.1 information and governance 
  Casson  (1997)  emphasizes  the  influence  of 
collecting information and communicating it over firms 
on long term relationships. There are different prices in 
the market, corresponding to different links throughout a 
supply chain, for example, raw material supplier’s price, 
processor’s price, wholesaler’s price and retailer’s price. 
  Ideally, the information flow should be clear, 
transparent and available to each firm, but this is rarely 
true.  There are basically two kinds of information along 
the chain, market information and technical information. 
The  first  one  deals  with  customers,  competitors, 
suppliers, distribution channels, among others, by which 
the profitability of the investment is directly or indirectly 
influenced.  The  second  kind,  technical  information, 
deals  with  product  and  process  standards,  regulation, 
certification  and  all  other  conditions,  which  do  not 
consist of plans and actions by other people.
  For Richardson (1990), the importance of making 
a distinction of technical and market information happens 
because of the difference in the way each is available. He 
says that the extent to which a manager can obtain market 
information depends on the structure of the market, while 
the access to technical information does not. Oligopolies and 
monopolies, for example, tend to hold market information 
to barrier the entrance of new companies or to increase 
bargain pwer. On the other, technical information is more 
easily available, for example, stated in code of practices or 
included in public regulation.
  However,  information  issues  can  also  be 
distinguished between ex-ante and ex-post information 
problems (DOUMA & SCHREUDER, 1998). Hidden 
information is an ex-ante information problem, which 
arises when one party has private information relevant 
to a potential transaction but the other does not. It is ex-
ante when this private information exists before both 
agree to conclude a transaction. Markets and firms offer 
different solutions to this kind of information problem 
(such as contracts, commodities prices, among others). 
An  ex-post  information  problem  applies  after  agents 
have agreed to carry out a transaction. The information Organizações Rurais & Agroindustriais, Lavras, v.10, n.3, p. 317-327, 2008
320 VIEIRA, L. M.
concerns unobservable behaviour of one of the agents 
when executing the transaction. For example, a company 
with environmental concerns can ask its suppliers to be 
careful in waste processing. However, a supplier may not 
follow this to avoid extra costs and act opportunistically. 
This valuable information would affect the transaction if 
both agents were aware of this. 
  Douma & Schreuder (1998) point out vertical 
integration  as  one  possible  solution  to  information 
problems  as  firms  are  more  capable  of  dealing  with 
certain information problems than markets. This means 
that there is a trade-off between economies of scale and 
specialisation on the one hand and transaction costs on 
the other. For example, a less developed food system 
(based upon personal transactions) would present low 
transaction costs but higher production costs. In a large 
and  complex  system,  whilst  economies  of  scale  are 
present,  the  impersonal  exchange  gives  considerable 
scope  for  all  kinds  of  opportunistic  behaviour  and, 
consequently, high transactions costs. 
  It is worth pointing out that an efficient information 
flow  will  reduce  uncertainty.  Relevant  and  accurate 
information on prices, locations of effective demand, preferred 
quality  characteristics  or  alternative  marketing  channels 
could improve the bargaining terms of a transaction. 
  Governance  is  the  term  used  by Williamson 
(1985) to characterise the set of institutional arrangements 
within which the transaction is organised. TCE compares 
different governance forms, choosing the most efficient 
in terms of reducing transaction costs. 
  Governance,  according  to  Williamson,  is 
the  vertical  organisation  of  activities  searching  for 
efficiency. TCE framework is traditionally characterised 
by dichotomy between governance through the market 
(made up of isolated firms using spot market transactions) 
and,  at  the  other  extreme,  the  vertical  integration 
(exemplified  by  the  large,  vertically  corporation). 
Between these two extremes, there are several forms 
that are known as hybrid forms. Governance allows 
firms to receive, process, diffuse and use information to 
elaborate competitive strategies, reacting to changes and 
taking advantage of opportunities. 
  Although  there  are  different  forms  of 
governance of economic activities, there is not a best 
way  to  co-ordinate  them,  a  firm  can  adopt  different 
forms, one for each specific situation or market. 
2.2 The Vertical integration Decision
  Some  authors  (FRANK  &  HENDERSON, 
1992)  say  that  vertical  integration  is  often  used  in 
situations where it would be better employed to describe 
the entire process by which the various functions of a 
system work in harmony. Therefore, large companies 
internalise  those  activities  that  had  been  or  could  be 
carried out by several business units and the transactions 
that had been or could be carried out between them. 
However, this study uses the term vertical integration 
implying that one company owns another upstream or 
downstream the supply chain.
  The  main  advantage  of  vertical  integration, 
according to TCE, is that the routinisation of transactions 
would  lower  transaction  costs. This  happens  because 
there is a learning process involved in performing an 
activity  frequently.  The  vertical  integration  strategy 
takes  dispersed  information  to  a  central  planner  who 
is expected to solve the resource allocation problems. 
(MILGROM & ROBERTS, 1992). Table 1 summarises 
some  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  using  vertical 
integration strategy.
TCE approach focuses on agents facing a decision among 
distinct  governance  forms.  The  transaction  features 
determine the level of transaction costs, influenced by 
behavioural  assumption,  and  the  perusal  of  the  most 
cost efficient form. In Operations Management field, the 
decision to vertically integrate is part of the structural 
decisions of a company. This decision has trade-offs, 
regarding extra costs, performing activities out of the 
core  competence  but  it  also  assures  control  over  the 
distribution channel or supply assurance. In sum, when 
vertical integration strategy is well planed and aligned to 
the organizational features of a company, it will take it to 
a competitive advantageOrganizações Rurais & Agroindustriais, Lavras, v.10, n.3, p. 317-327, 2008
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Table 1: Some Advantages and Disadvantages of Vertical Integration
Advantages Disadvantages
Internal benefits
Integrated economies reduce costs by eliminating 
steps, reducing duplicate overheads and cutting costs 
(technology dependent).
Improved governance of activities reduces inventory 
costs.
Avoid time-consuming tasks, such as price shopping, 
communicating design or negotiating contracts 
(transaction costs).
Internal Costs
Need for overheads to co-ordinate vertical integration 
increases costs.
Burden of excess capacity from unevenly balanced 
minimum-efficient-scale plants.
Poorly organised vertically integrated firms do not enjoy 
synergies that compensate for higher costs.
Lack of specialisation according to core skills.
Competitive benefits
Avoid foreclosure to inputs, services, or markets.
Improved marketing or technological intelligence.
Increased value-added
Market power
Create credibility for new products.
Synergies could be created by coordinating vertical 
activities skillfully
Competitive dangers
Obsolete processes may be perpetuated.
Creates mobility (or exit) barriers.
Links firms to sick adjacent businesses.
Loss of access to information from suppliers or 
distributors.
Synergies created through vertical integration may be 
overrated.
Managers integrated before thinking through the most 
appropriate way to do so.
Source: Adapted from Harrigan (1985).
equipment has no use for other customers, the costs may 
be too high. For the customer, it is also risky that the 
supplier decides to supply a competitor or engage in new 
activities. In such a case, the vertical integration strategy 
is suggested. The form of governance was often modeled 
as a binary variable: “make” or “buy”.  Studies analysed 
in these authors review fall into one of three categories:
1)  Qualitative case studies
2)  Quantitative case studies
3)  Cross-sectional econometric analysis
  The  large  part  of  the  empirical  literature  in 
TCE consists of case studies. This happens primarily 
because  of  the  main  variables  of  interest  to  TCE  – 
asset specificity, uncertainty, frequency – are difficult 
to  measure  consistently  across  firms  and  industries 
(SHELANSKY & KLEIN, 1995). Sometimes, the non-
measurable  character  of  transaction  costs  is  not  easy 
2.2.1 methods of studying Tce
  This section focuses on methods used to apply 
the TCE framework. Shelansky & Klein (1995) review 
empirical research in TCE analysing studies carried out 
in several industries. In common, these studies use the 
form  of  governance  as  the  dependent  variable,  while 
asset  specificity,  uncertainty  and  frequency  are  the 
independent variables. Their review suggests that the 
probability of observing a more integrated governance 
structure depends positively on the amount or value of 
the transaction-specific assets involved in the relationship 
and, for significant levels of asset specificity, on the degree 
of uncertainty about the future of the relationship and on 
the frequency of the transaction. This can exemplified 
by the risk that a supplier goes through when making a 
specific investment (for instance, while acquiring new 
equipments) to comply with one customer’s demand. 
If the duration of this relationship is uncertain and the Organizações Rurais & Agroindustriais, Lavras, v.10, n.3, p. 317-327, 2008
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to  separate  from  other  managerial  costs.  Typically, 
these characteristics are estimated based on surveys or 
interviews  (for  example,  using  a  Likert  scale).  Since 
these measurements are based on ordinal rankings, it is 
hard to compare them from industry to industry. 
  Shelansky  &  Klein  (1995)  find  that  asset 
specificity  and  uncertainty  are  the  more  consistent 
reasons to explain vertical integration, which is the form 
of governance more commonly studied within the TCE 
framework. They conclude that the body of empirical 
research  aligns  with  the  TCE  predictions,  but  they 
suggest that refining and developing evidence on hybrid 
forms governance (co-operative strategies) still remains 
to be done. Although it is easy to agree that there are costs 
involved with a transaction, they are difficult to measure 
in financial terms. From this review, it is concluded that 
the majority of empirical applications of TCE framework 
have  analysed  the  extent  to  which  transaction  costs 
features affect the form of governance. The advance of 
studies moves from the assessment of vertical integration 
to  the  formation  of  hybrid  (co-operative)  forms. The 
importance of supply chain management may explain 
the change of the focus of analysis to more co-operation 
strategies  between  agents.  However,  qualitative  and 
exploratory studies are still gathering evidences to refine 
the TCE framework to include properly hybrid forms 
governance. The vertical integration decision framework 
is, so far, better developed for research purposes.
3 meThOD Of This sTUDy
  Case study is a method popular in applied social 
sciences  (Sociology,  Management  and  Business)  and, 
recently,  agricultural  economists  have  been  applying 
these  methods  (STERNS  et  al.,  1998; WESTGREN  & 
ZERING, 1998), especially those researching the business 
management  of  food  companies.  Authors  think  that 
agribusiness researchers are in a privileged position to be 
closer to industry than researchers of strategy behaviour 
in  other  industries.  For  example,  Westgren  &  Zering 
(1998) argue that case studies can illustrate the range of 
organizational forms and strategies used in an industry, 
without attempting to calculate their incidence. In this study, 
the aim is to explore the different parts of a transactional 
process and work out how the parts are linked. Researching 
cases  can  offer  a  unique  tool  to  refine  or  build  theory 
by  examining  events  not  suited  to  traditional  statistical 
approaches (WESTGREN & ZERING, 1998). Compared 
to  surveys,  case  studies  can  better  answer  “hows”  and 
“whys” because the case analysis can address motivations 
and actions in greater detail. Silverman (2001) suggests 
that the initial move should be to give attention to “how” 
agents  interact.  Then,  it  is  considered  “why”  questions 
about institutional and behavioural constraints. This is the 
procedure used in this study.
  The purpose is to test and clarify an existing 
theory (TCE) and the researcher can select a set of case 
studies to purposefully challenge a priori assumptions 
and theoretical assertions. Sterns et al. (1998) relate this 
to Yin’s analogy between case study and a lab scientist 
conducting  experiments.  Both  are  used  to  determine 
if  the  theory  holds  up  under  specific  conditions  and 
parameters of a given case.
  The  case  study  was  selected  because  of  the 
forms of co-ordination used and that they would change 
according to the features of the marketing channel. The 
case  study  was  conducted  analysing  documentation, 
through semi-structured interviews and direct observation 
(site visits). The documentation analysed were secondary 
data (such as theses, dissertations, journals, newspapers 
and  technical  magazines)  and  promotional  brochures 
provided  by  the  companies  visited.  When  available, 
production costs and annual report were also focus of 
analysis.
  The semi structured interviews took about two 
hours following a group of questions. The interview was 
recorded on tape. The session focused particularly on the 
following issues: activities carried out by the company, 
interactions with other links (suppliers, customers) and 
to  what  degree,  input  and  output  features,  how  this 
information  is  collected,  how  prices  are  determined 
and problems perceived in the marketing channels and 
international food standards and safety measures.Organizações Rurais & Agroindustriais, Lavras, v.10, n.3, p. 317-327, 2008
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4 The beef prOcessOr DecisiOn
  This section presents a beef processor and its reasons 
for vertical integration decision through a TCE perspective.
4.1 beef processor Description
  The company studied is beef processor called 
“A” and located in São Paulo state. This company is 
a family business and is one of the largest exporters in 
Brazil, selling 45% of its production to North America, 
Chile, the Far East, the European Union and the Middle 
East.  The  other  55%  beef  production  supplies  the 
domestic  market  (supermarkets  and  small  retailers). 
This firm has five processing plants with a total slaughter 
capacity of 4,500 cattle heads per day. 
4.2 Vertical integration
  The beef processor “A” has a backward vertical 
integration,  owning  seven  farms,  where  it  breeds 
livestock  integrating  all  the  stages  of  the  production 
system  (nursing,  raising  and  fattening).  The  farm 
manager is a family member and says that the vertical 
integration  strategy  acts  as  a  protection  against  price 
distortions or lack of supply. It also sources from local 
farms at auction markets or through cattle merchants. 
When asked about the possibility to establish alliances 
with the cattle producers, the beef processor manager 
tell  that  there  have  been  three  or  four  attempts  to 
establish closer relationships with some selected cattle 
suppliers and none of them have been successful. When 
this  issue  was  raised  during  the  interview  with  one 
local cattle producer, he said “it is better to try to get 
some profit in each negotiation than to be tied by a long 
term contract”. This kind of opinion of the suppliers 
illustrates the opportunistic behaviour perceived by the 
agents involved in the beef transaction. As a result, the 
beef processor justifies the use of a backward vertical 
integration due to a probable opportunistic behaviour 
among suppliers, and having an “in-house” alternative. 
According to him, this strategy reduces the processor’s 
information  costs  in  the  long-term.  In  addition,  it 
increases the company’s power when negotiating prices 
and standards with his suppliers. Thus, this processor 
uses  the  two  extreme  forms  of  governance:  vertical 
integration and spot market. 
4.3 market information
  The findings point that there is a large amount 
of technical information available to the beef processor 
but few marketing information (such as trends, consumer 
behaviour,  distribution  channels  requirements,  among 
others). The beef processor says that it would like to 
know more about the end consumer in the export market. 
At present, the sales transactions are carried out based 
on  monthly  orders  and  occasional  visit  by  inspector 
(representing the importer, which is a wholesaler) to the 
processing plant. This inspector checks the compliance 
with Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point process 
(HACCP) and cues of the final product (such as leanness, 
colour, package material, cut, marbling, etc).  The beef 
processor considers that there is little knowledge transfer 
in this relationship. The manager perceives this lack of 
information exchange because the transaction happens 
through a wholesaler, so there is no clear understanding 
of the end market. Based on this perception, the company 
is developing its own export brand and has opened up an 
office in Italy to learn more about this market dynamics 
and  to  try  to  negotiate  directly  with  supermarket 
chains there and other countries members of the EU. 
The company plan is to develop commercial alliances 
downstream  (hybrid  forms  of  governance)  with  local 
distributors and retailers that value Brazilian beef.  
4.4 Asset Specificity
  Regarding asset specificity, the results of the 
case study shows that there are some attributes that are 
necessary to the export market but not required in the 
Brazilian context. For example, beef has some search 
attributes (colour, leanness, appearance, etc) and process 
standards such as traceability (which is enforced by the Organizações Rurais & Agroindustriais, Lavras, v.10, n.3, p. 317-327, 2008
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Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture – MAPA) that results 
on a high asset specificity transaction. Therefore, the 
company perceives that spot market transactions could 
no  longer  guarantee  regularity  of  supply  to  export 
market. Likewise, the beef processor had problems to 
develop co-operative relationships with suppliers that 
could provide the necessary input (in this case, traceable 
cattle).  The  processor  admits  having  made  previous 
attempts  at  selecting  preferential  suppliers.  However, 
this approach did not create great incentive to encourage 
beef producers to overcome the sense of inherent mistrust 
existent. As a consequence, the beef processor complies 
with  process  standards  through  vertical  integration 
between production and processing activities. In export 
market, so far, the brand used is the wholesaler’s and 
transactions can be considered spot market.  
  This figure represents the chain configuration, 
where  the  processor  has  to  vertically  integrate  its 
supply inputs through the ownership of farms. This is a 
strategy to reduce uncertainty and to comply with asset 
specificity,  specifically,  traceable  cattle.  On  the  other 
hand, the European Union importer set the standards, 
price and brand but there are no contracts or partnership 
involved in this transaction.
5 DiscUssiOn AnD implicATiOns
  The theoretical discussion rises that the form 
of governance depends on the transaction features of 
frequency, uncertainty and asset specificity (MENARD, 
1996; WILLIAMSON, 1975, 1985). According to TCE, 
greater governance in the form of vertical integration 
is  necessary  to  overcome  higher  transaction  costs 
(information, negotiation and monitoring). For example, 
the uncertainty of timing of product increases the search 
costs. Thus, TCE proposes that higher transaction costs 
increase the need for governance.
  The  main  transaction  costs  identified  in  the 
case study of the beef processor “A”  are the costs of 
finding physical attributes in the livestock (information 
costs), and finding and negotiating with producers with 
traceability in order to guarantee the safety of the output 
(information and negotiation costs). As a consequence, 
beef  processor,  in  relation  to  export  market,  declared 
that he was incurring high information costs and high 
negotiation  costs  to  source  beef.  The  need  to  comply 
with process standards also led to high monitoring costs. 
For example, the company studied traditionally sourced 
using spot market form of governance. However, the EU 
requirement to only import traceable cattle led the beef 
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processor “A” to integrate backwards in order to control 
product quality and reduce uncertainties in beef supplies. 
The vertical integration was a strategic response to be 
able to sustain its sales to the EU market. While vertical 
integration strategy reduces information and negotiation 
costs of the processor, it tends to increase the costs of 
monitoring  the  producer  behaviour  and  production 
practices. The findings concur with the TCE framework 
about  the  transaction  costs  leading  to  greater  chain 
coordination  or  vertical  integration  need  (FRANK  & 
HENDERSON, 1992; MILGROM & ROBERTS, 1992).
  The other assumption that the TCE literature 
review showed is that companies where there is high 
asset specificity are more likely to have greater chain 
governance  that  those  without.  Asset  specificity  is 
related  to  two  factors:  the  first  is  how  specific  the 
investment  is  for  the  activity  and  the  second  factor 
are the costs of reallocating it for another use. Asset 
specificity is considered the primary determinant of the 
form of governance (FRANK & HENDERSON, 1992; 
WILLIAMSON, 1985) and there are six different sources 
of specificity (MENARD, 1997). This assumption was 
confirmed by the case study that highlighted two assets 
specificities  implied  in  the  export  transaction:  one  is 
related  to  process  (traceability)  and  other  to  product 
(HACCP)  standards.  According  to  the  interviewees, 
the HACCP may increase 20% processing costs. This 
investment is not transferable to the domestic market, 
where consumer does not value food safety concerns. 
As a consequence, these investments can be considered 
high  specificity  as  suggested  by  Menard  (1997)  and 
Neves (2003).
  The  case  study  findings  are  aligned  to  the 
general assumptions presented by the TCE theory. The 
beef  processor  “A”  vertically  integrated  its  operations 
backwards to be able to comply with export standards. 
Although there is an argument that TCE is a bad theory 
for general management when used as a normative theory 
(GHOSHAL & MORAN, 1996), in this paper we propose 
TCE as a positive and descriptive theory which provides a 
framework for decision making. 
  Regarding the case study, TCE helped identify 
key  points  of  major  strategic  decisions  on  vertical 
integration, reducing the effect of uncertainty depending on 
competitive conditions. It is possible to say that if there is 
no asset specificity and thus there are many potential input 
suppliers for which future demand is uncertain, it may be 
cheaper to buy the component or to develop alliances than 
to make it internally. However, the results also suggest 
that vertical integration is a costly and difficult strategy. It 
is also true that the analytical understanding provided by 
TCE of buyers and sellers behaviour is important to the 
vertical integration decision and it lacks on the traditional 
operation strategy framework. 
  The  understanding  of  trust  inherent  to  the 
development  of  alliances  or  other  hybrid  forms  of 
governance is a intangible resource that would explain 
why to vertically integrate or not. The literature review and 
the case study suggest that the inclusion of behavioural 
concepts is the most important contribution of TCE to 
the operations management area. It also supports the idea 
that the advance of research on operation management 
should  be  aligned  to  the  applicability  of  the  theories 
developed on the real world (SLACK et al., 2004). 
  Whilst this study has added to the current state 
of  knowledge,  it  must  also  be  accepted  that  there  are 
several limitations to the research. The assessment has 
been exploratory supported by a single case study. Some 
concepts are difficult to identify and depend very much 
on the interpretation of the researcher. Further research 
suggests  the  generation  of  hypotheses  supported  by 
TCE  (asset  specificity,  frequency,  and  uncertainty  and 
transaction costs) to be tested aligned to the operations 
strategy theory.
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